The aim of this paper is to set out some features of Kant's conception of transcendental philosophy. I would like to argue that this philosophy, although it is situated at a higher level of discourse than common knowledge, does not essentially transcend the limits that it sets to this knowledge. In order to achieve this, I stress the fact that Kant regards experience as a mere "possibility." Now, the Critique of Pure Reason explains that the human understanding cannot conceive of an absolute possibility, but only a relative one, namely a possibility that is tied to conditions. And possible experience as a whole is no exception here. Hence the expression "conditions of the possibility of experience" which designates the topic of the Transcendental Analytic. This also means that experience is "contingent" (A 737/B 765). It is not in itself necessary; rather, it is dependent upon certain conditions. But then we learn that the most important transcendental conditions for this experience, i.e., the dynamic principles, are themselves "contingent" (A 160/B 199). Consequently, these transcendental conditions are not unconditioned; they in turn depend on empirical conditions, over which they have no control.
Now the question is: What is the legitimacy of Kant's own transcendental discourse when we take account of the restrictions imposed on human knowledge as a result of this very investigation? In other words, the use of a priori knowledge being restricted to possible experience, how could the knowledge claim of this philosophical enquiry be justified if it does not itself take place within possible experience? The problem already becomes obvious with the formulation of the main result of the critical investigation, namely that the only valid sphere for a priori knowledge is "possible experience." Yet how are we to understand the use of the word "possible" here? To be sure, possibility is a modal category whose conditions of legitimate application are strictly determined and restricted in the transcendental Analytic. And the same goes for the category of contingency, which, as we will see, plays an important role in specifying the status of the conditions of the possibility of experience. But then again the question is: Does Kant make an inappropriate or illegitimate use of these categories when, rather than applying them to objects of a possible experience, he uses them to describe the scope of valid a priori knowledge as a whole? By apparently removing the restrictions on their use here, it seems as though Kant is making a transcendent or, as he would say, "transcendental," employment of the categories of modality.
I will argue, however, that this use of the categories complies, all things considered, with the constraints imposed upon them for their application in experience. We will find that the categories at work in Kant's transcendental discourse are not employed without caution in their purely intellectual significance, which would lead them to open unto the unconditioned, as in the Transcendental Dialectic. On the contrary, the standpoint from which critical philosophy condemns every attempt to gain knowledge of the unconditioned is not itself unconditioned. I would like to show that transcendental philosophy, even when it circumscribes the limits of human knowledge with the help of the modal categories of possibility and contingency, nevertheless remains finite and refrains from overstepping the "bounds of sense." In order to achieve this, we will have to pay attention and define carefully Kantian expressions found in the first Critique such as "possible experience," "transcendental knowledge," "conditions of the possibility," and "contingency" which in the end will lead us to establish the modal status of the ultimate presuppositions of critical philosophy.
Possible experience
Before we inquire into the role played by possible experience in the transcendental philosophy developed in the first Critique, we would be well advised to focus on the meaning of each of these words. "Experience" is a well-known Kantian term designating the knowledge of objects that are "given in empirical intuition" or, if one prefers, the "knowledge of the objects through perception." The short definition is thus "empirical knowledge," 2 whereby it is understood that this knowledge lays claim to objectivity. Experience is in fact objective empirical knowledge.
"Possibility" is a modal category which, from a strictly logical point of view, refers to that which does not contradict itself. To say that a concept is "possible" simply means that its internal components are not in contradiction with each other. This is what Baumgarten in his Metaphysica calls "absolute" possibility 3 -a characterization for which he is criticized in Kant's lectures on metaphysics as well as (though implicitly) in the Transcendental Dialectic. 4 In fact, Baumgarten uses the adjective "absolute" to designate "intrinsic" possibility, which according to Kant is the "least" that can be said of the concept of an object. But the strong meaning of the word should be maintained. In Kant's view, absolute possibility properly signifies the "most" that can be said of a concept, namely that its object is possible literally "in all respects" and "without any restriction" whatsoever. 5 Kant feels the need to restore the strong sense of the term "absolute" at the beginning of the Transcendental Dialectic because it is synonymous with "unconditioned," which is the main topic of this second part of the Critique devoted to the logic of illusion. Indeed, a possibility that is absolute in the full sense of the word pertains not to the understanding but to reason, 6 and this category gives rise to the same problem as the modal concept of "unconditioned necessity" used by the dogmatic metaphysician in the cosmological proof of the existence of God. That is, both concepts exceed the grasp of the human mind: "The unconditioned necessity, which we need so indispensably as the ultimate sustainer of all things, is for human reason the true abyss." 7 The treatment reserved for the modal categories in the Transcendental Analytic reveals that only "hypothetical" necessity, that is, conditioned necessity, is available to human cognition, and the same goes for possibility, as we learn in Reflexion 4005: "With reason we can cognize only conditioned possibility." 8 The only kind of possibility that can be grasped by a finite unederstanding is relative possibility, namely that which is possible only in some respects. instance Kant's example of the "invented concepts" of substances and forces supposedly present in experience. It is not enough to say that such concepts are possible because they are not selfcontradictory. To be sure, this satisfies the minimal requirement of their logical possibility, but their real possibility also has to be established within experience by showing that these objects can be instantiated according to its known laws. 10 This is a clear example of conditioned possibility.
Now when Kant considers possible experience as a whole, rather than just particular objects within it, he maintains a similar restriction on his recourse to the concept of possibility.
Experience might well be declared "possible," but here again only as a conditioned possibility.
Hence the central expression for the Critique of Pure Reason: "conditions of the possibility of experience." 11 Experience taken globally will thus be possible solely under a set of conditions. As we can see, Kant remains coherent in his use of the category of possibility: experience's possibility also depends on conditions, and most importantly on transcendental conditions. We will have to enquire into the nature of this transcendental conditioning, but before going any further we must again focus our attention on Kant's terminology.
Transcendental knowledge
Let us quote the canonical definition of the term "transcendental" given in the second edition of the Introduction of the Critique: "I call transcendental all knowledge that is occupied not so much with objects but rather with our mode of knowledge of objects insofar as this mode of knowledge is to be possible a priori." 12 Here we clearly have two levels of knowledge: a first level concerned with the knowledge of objects and a second level dealing with our mode of knowledge a priori of these objects, which is precisely what transcendental knowledge is about.
This means that in the Transcendental Analytic Kant is concerned primarily with a priori knowledge, or better: with our a priori mode of knowledge of objects.
However, all a priori knowledge is subject to a constraint: it can never reach the object in its actuality. For this, according to the teachings of the transcendental Analytic, the empirical dimension of the object must be added, at which point the knowledge becomes a posteriori. As we can read in the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science, "[t]o know something a priori means to know it in its mere possibility." 13 Transcendental knowledge is no exception here, and so it is no surprise that it is oriented exclusively toward "possible" experience. 14 The a priori knowledge introduced in the Transcendental Analytic is aimed at grounding the mere possibility of experience, and for this purpose it has to "abstract from everything empirical in the appearances." 15 Furthermore, it must be noted that knowledge of the a priori conditions of experience is not just any kind of a priori knowledge. It is, as I already said, a second-level knowledge. Its distinctive nature will become clear if we compare it with first-level kind of a priori knowledge such as pure geometry. While geometry is focused exclusively on its objects, which are merely ideal, the a priori conditions of experience on the other hand concern our mode of knowledge of real objects insofar as it presents their a priori components. It is nonetheless a form of 'knowledge', with its own truth claim -not empirical, to be sure, but transcendental. And since, for Kant, truth means adaequatio, that is, the correspondence of knowledge with its correlate, 16 transcendental truth also involves such a correlate: possible experience.
In order to establish this correlation we can mention the two passages in the Analytic dealing with this specific truth claim. The first one appears, as we know, in the Schematism owes its own possibility to these a priori conditions. 'Possible experience' thus has a twofold meaning: 1) experience is made possible by a priori conditions; and 2) possible experience confers validity on the entire transcendental apparatus. 19 anchorage point, so to speak. If the correlate of the a priori conditions of experience were a given object to which such knowledge could correspond, the reader of the Critique of Pure Reason would have a much easier task. But as we have seen, this correlate is a mere possibility. There is no actual object nor any well secured knowledge to rely on. It goes without saying that Kant is fully aware of this situation, which is bound up with his way of proceeding in the Critique, as he will himself later admit in the Prolegomena. The Critique does not presuppose any "fact"
whatsoever. 20 The only thing that is given is reason as a faculty of cognition, which contains (together with the pure forms of intuition) the a priori elements that make all knowledge, and indeed all objects of knowledge, possible. Beginning with those a priori elements, the first
Critique adopts a synthetic and progressive procedure that leads to the possibility of experience.
In contrast, the Prolegomena of 1783 offer a more accessible presentation of transcendental philosophy beginning from two sciences, pure mathematics and pure natural science, both of which are already firmly established and aptly combined in Newtonian physics. A regressive analysis -from the given to its presuppositions --of these pure sciences thus allows a much easier access to their a priori conditions of possibility.
As a reminder, we may quote a passage from the Transcendental Methodology which highlights the difficulty of proving a transcendental principle when the regressive procedure is excluded, as it is the case in the first Critique. What I have in mind is the end of the chapter on the Discipline of Pure Reason in Dogmatic Use, where Kant writes that the principle of causality can be proven apodictically, but only with regard to the experience that is thereby made possible.
The proof therefore cannot take experience for granted and rely on it as a point of reference, since experience is first made possible by this very principle: "it [the principle of causality] has the special property that it first makes possible its ground of proof, namely experience, and must always be presupposed in this [experience] ." 2-That which is connected with the material conditions of experience (of sensation) is actual.
3-That whose connection with the actual is determined in accordance with the general conditions of experience is (exists) necessarily.
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As we can see, the first postulate concerns the formal aspect of experience, the second its matter, i.e., "sensation" which is for Kant "the sole characteristic of actuality," 23 whereas the third, which deals with an "existence" that is at the same time recognized as necessary, is simply a combination of the first two Postulates. 24 In this third case we can think of Kant's famous example, "the sun warms the stone." The actuality of the warmth of the stone (known through sensation) is necessary because it is the effect of the sun's rays.
To be sure, the first Postulate has to do with the conditions that make an "object" (Ding, Gegenstand) 25 speaking of intensive magnitude, he writes that the luminosity of the sun can be calculated a priori. To be sure, the sun and its light are not known a priori, but the calculus as such allows one to "construct" this magnitude "a priori." 29 It is obvious that all the principles of the Transcendental Analytic are 'necessary'
conditions of the possibility of experience, but the mathematical principles are further declared "necessary" in their very exercise (Ausübung): their evidence is intuitive and they are a priori constitutive of the object of experience itself, at least as far as its anticipated magnitude is concerned. 30 On the other hand, the application of the dynamical principles, that is, the Analogies of Experience and the Postulates of Empirical Thinking in General, are said to be merely "contingent" in the sense that even though these principles anticipate experience, their exercise is "indirect" and "mediated." 31 The reason for this distinction is that the latter principles are concerned not so much with the mere intuition of the object as with its existence. And existence cannot be constructed a priori; it must first manifest itself empirically in order to be regulated by the dynamical principles.
Consider the dynamical principle of causality. According to this principle, once an appearance has presented itself through a sensation (for instance, a stone that becomes warm), this event can only be interpreted as an effect whose cause must be sought in a preceding moment in time, such as the emission of sunrays, for example. The difference between mathematical and dynamical principles can best be illustrated by Kant's distinction between mathematical and philosophical (dynamical) types of "analogy." 32 A mathematical analogy deals solely with quantitative relations, so that if three terms of an equation are given then the fourth can be found a priori and determined with precision. In contrast, a dynamical analogy concerns the qualitative (typically causal) relations between objects with respect to their existence. First, the fourth term is "given" (for example, the warm stone), and then the principle only provides a rule to inquire about the third term, without allowing us to anticipate a priori what this third element will be. meaning. The logical definition of contingency simply refers to something whose non-being does not imply contradiction. 36 For a more telling definition, for 'real' definition, we must turn to the way Kant applies it within experience. The details of this use are spelled out in the General Note on the System of the Principles added to the second edition of the Critique. 37 There we learn that contingency as a category of modality can only be understood if it is linked with another set of categories, namely the categories of relation. Indeed, contingency is for human knowledge essentially a 'relational' concept. It must be related to something else because otherwise we would be left with an "absolute contingency," which according to Kant is too "big" a concept for us. 38 This coincides with our earlier findings about the absolute possibility: it is the "most" that can be said on the possibility of a concept and as such a finite mind cannot understand what it means. Let us recall that Kant refrains from deciding if, for example, substance in experience is in itself contingent or necessary -we simply cannot know since such a knowledge would call for a speculative use of reason. 39 Contingency then applies only to the accidents of appearances, since they can be interrelated. Kant gives the case of a body that was first in movement and has come to rest. As such, the mere change from movement to rest proves neither the contingency of this resting state nor of the movement observed earlier: these contrary states of the body occur at different times. To claim that the initial movement is contingent, we have to admit that at that initial time the body could just as well have been at rest. Yet this can only be made comprehensible to our finite knowledge if we presuppose that the reason why the body was in motion, rather than at rest, is that this motion results from some cause. And this is what Kant has in mind when he claims that contingency is comprehensible solely with the help of the categories of relation, in particular cause-and-effect: the movement of the body is a contingent state because, without the action of a cause, the body would have initially been at rest. Contingency is intrinsically linked with the concept of cause. 40 Can we now apply this reading, valid within the field of experience, to our prior question about the contingency of the transcendental principles that Kant calls dynamical? To be sure, the relation to be established here cannot be to a physical 'cause' as in the example above. But it should at least take the form of a "condition," to use a more neutral term. If the Analogies of
Experience are contingent in their application, this means that, as a priori conditions of experience, they are themselves 'conditioned'. 41 Naturally both the formal and the material conditions are combined for the production of experience, but it is important to specify the terms of this joint contribution. In his lectures on metaphysics, Kant deals repeatedly with the question of multiple causes contributing to a single effect (in our case: experience). He calls them concaussae (or Mitursachen) and suggests that there are two ways for them to bring about their effect: Either they run parallel and remain merely coordinated, or they are subordinated. 44 If we apply this model to the transcendental production of experience, we are compelled to conclude, after what we have seen, that the dynamical principles are subordinated to the possibility of the material conditions, at least if they are to be a priori cognitions at all. These a priori synthetic propositions are conditioned cognitions, which can in no way lay claim to the status of the unconditioned and which therefore do not have to be
implemented by an absolute subject.
in the constitution of experience. The spontaneity of the understanding, which culminates in the unity of apperception, is known only through the way it "affects" inner sense. In this case inner sense contains the reflection of this activity, which consists essentially in combining representations. 45 The empirical representations are at first present in their merely subjective order, and the role of the understanding through its spontaneity is to introduce an objective order among them. For example, if the perception of the warm stone comes first and then afterward the perception of the rays of the sun, it would be erroneous to claim, in accordance with the subjective temporal succession, that the first perception is the cause of the second and to say that the warm stone has produced the hot sunrays. The understanding simply restores the objective order of things.
But the thinking subject thereby runs up against the limits of its spontaneity. Such an activity is limited to the combination of the representations in inner sense. The spontaneity of the understanding does not however produce the manifold of these representations, since it would then be an intuitive understanding. If Kant's transcendental investigation aims at establishing the limits of human knowledge, these limits must also be recognized within the transcendental apparatus: "That understanding through whose self-consciousness the manifold of intuition would at the same time be given, an understanding through whose representation the objects… would at the same time exist, would not require a special act of the synthesis of the manifold for the unity of consciousness, which the human understanding, which merely thinks, but does not intuit, does require." 46 In other words, an understanding that would directly intuit the existence of its object would not be conditioned. It would be totally independent and self-sufficient. It would produce its object of knowledge without any further condition, that is, without external conditions.
We have seen that the material conditions are precisely what show the limits of the a priori conditions of experience. If, on the one hand, inner sense can be affected 'from within' by the spontaneity of the understanding, it can also be affected 'from without', via outer sense, by perception, which represents a radical type of otherness vis-à-vis the transcendental subject. 47 Kant sometimes calls it the "transcendental object," but it is best known as the notorious "thing in itself." This is the sphere where the passivity of the subject begins, where receptivity takes on its full significance.
I know all too well that the thing in itself is a hotly disputed topic, but I simply want to stress that Kant's positing of the thing in itself does not represent a leap into the unconditioned.
On the contrary, the thing in itself is the ultimate recognition of the conditioned character of the knowing subject and of her knowledge. This second kind of affection of inner sense (via outer sense) cannot be attributed merely to the appearances, nor can it be regarded as a mere epistemic requirement, that is, an object of thought. It is an ontological statement that is constitutive of Kant's investigation of the limits of human knowledge. As Karl Ameriks has argued, there has to be a legitimate place for "transcendental affection" in Kant. 48 For instance, Kant is aware that the "I think" of the transcendental deduction contains an existential statement although he refrains from exploiting it in a Cartesian fashion and cautions that nothing can be known about the nature of the transcendental subject. The Dialectic will remind us that it is even impossible to say that it is a substance. 49 It is nevertheless admitted as existing. Now it should be possible to say the same of the counterpart of the transcendental subject: the thing in itself. Nothing can be known of its nature, but its specific kind of affection of sensibility is nonetheless essential for the general possibility of experience.
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Conclusion
We raised the question of whether it was legitimate for Kant's transcendental discourse to use certain modal categories beyond the realm of empirical knowledge (experience), that is, outside of the only type of knowledge in which a priori synthetic propositions have access to intuition, formal as well as material. To this question we might answer that the modal categories in Kant's transcendental discourse are ultimately focused on experience itself as a whole. In my view, this reference to possible empirical knowledge is precisely what justifies the use of these modal categories and what confers upon them a claim to truth in Kant's transcendental discourse, although, to be sure, this claim to objective reality is indirect. We are far from the typically "transcendental" use of the categories in the Dialectic. After all, experience in not an absolute possibility, much less an unconditioned necessity, like the dialectical idea of God, for example.
We are rather led to conclude with Kant that possible experience is in the end something "entirely contingent," 51 since it depends on a broad set of conditions. And we furthermore discovered that the most important among these transcendental conditions are themselves contingent in turn.
Unlike freedom, say, which is construed in the thesis of the third Antinomy as an absolute
